The introduction of accounting and auditing oversight boards (OBs) has been promoted on a global scale as a key component of the international financial architecture that has emerged over the past two decades. Such institutions, modeled on the Anglo-American tradition, are domestically organized and embedded within distinctively diverse institutional contexts. Their role is to ease agency problems, improve the quality of financial reporting, and help provide stability in the global financial system. We employ an institutional approach, located within the broader political economy framework of global capitalism, to examine the establishment and operation of the new regulatory regime in Greece. Greece, a member of the European Union, exhibits characteristics of a "delegative" democracy, i.e. a traditionally weak institutionalization, reform (in)capacity problems and a clientelistic political system. Our case study shows that the formation and operation of the newly-established system of oversight is conditioned by local political and economic constraints and, thus, does not automatically translate into concrete benefits for the quality of financial reporting. We also draw attention to the structural mismatch between a progressing globalized financial integration and the fragmented nature of the system of oversight, and illustrate that OBs' independence from local governments is an important but neglected issue.
Introduction
Internationally, the history of corporate accounting and auditing is replete with failures and scandals, followed by waves of regulation (e.g. Malsch & Gendron, 2011; Zeff, 2003) . In the past two decades of advancing globalization, reforms in the accounting domain have taken place within what Wade (2007a) calls the Standards-Surveillance-Compliance (SSC) doctrine, a regulatory framework of globally-integrated financial markets that aims to provide stability in the marketplace (Βüthe & Mattli, 2011; Davies & Green, 2008; Wade, 2007a Wade, , 2007b . This new dogma entails the use of comprehensive and universal standards, as well as codes of good practice, whose application would be overseen and enforced by a gamut of regulatory institutions and agencies -official or unofficial, national or global (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Humphrey, Loft, & Woods, 2009) .
A key element of the emerging international financial reporting infrastructure is the introduction of systems of oversight for accounting and audit practice, independent of the profession, which appears to signal an end to the tradition of self-regulation. Accounting and auditing oversight boards (OBs) serve as a basic mechanism for tackling perennial problems in corporate financial reporting and auditing, within the broader complex and hierarchical global regulatory system (Arnold, 2012; Humphrey et al., 2009; Wade, 2007a) . OBs emerged in the US under the SarbanesOxley Act (US Congress, 2002) , in the EU under the (new) Eighth Directive (European Commission, 2006) , and in other countries (Malsch & Gendron, 2011) . Their establishment rests on the assumption that they can operate efficiently and effectively to ease agency problems, improve the quality of financial reporting, and help to restore the trust of investors and the public (European Commission, 2001a US Congress, 2002 .
The system of oversight for accounting and auditing is domestically organized and embedded within distinctively diverse local political, economic, legal, and cultural contexts (e.g. Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2013) . O'Donnell (1994) argues that, for historical and socio-political reasons, some countries consistently exhibit a marked weakness in introducing social and economic reforms and in building strong and functional institutions of horizontal accountability. These countries, termed by O'Donnell as "delegative" democracies, are characterized by a highly clientelistic political system and state ineffectiveness, standing in contrast to other countries that have shown a history of successful reforms and strong institutionalization. Thus, the effectiveness of the operation (Caramanis & Papadakis, 2008; Christensen Hail, & Leuz, 2013; Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 2003; Osma & Pope, 2011) .
This article extends prior work on the establishment of the Greek OB (Blavoukos, Caramanis & Dedoulis, 2013) and contributes to emerging international academic literature on accounting and auditing oversight (e.g. Malsch & Gendron, 2011) on several fronts. First, our paper employs O'Donnell's theoretical conception of delegative democracies within a broader political economy framework to create the theoretical backdrop for investigating how local socio-political constraints condition the establishment and operation of an imported institution -a subject that is currently high on the global agenda. In particular, we show that the Greek OB has been stymied since inception by pre-existing local structures and remains essentially a dormant institution, providing no concrete benefits to financial reporting quality. Second, whereas the current system of oversight puts emphasis on ensuring the independence of OBs from the auditing profession, we illustrate that independence from government is an equally important but essentially neglected issue. Specifically, we argue that, while existing arrangements may have saved the oversight system from the Scylla of professional control, they have sailed too close to the Charybdis of state meddling.
Thus, our study draws attention to the structural mismatch between a progressing integration of the interdependent global financial system and the fragmented organization of accounting and auditing oversight on a domestic (national) level. This mismatch raises the question of the effectiveness of local OBs, given the diversity of the domestic socio-political contexts within which they emerge and the rather elementary level of current international or regional (e.g. EU) coordination (Davies & Green, 2008, pp. 89-91; Humphrey et al., 2009 ).
Our study is of relevance to several other countries that exhibit, albeit to varying degrees, a tradition of party patronage, clientelism, institutional weaknesses and state ineffectiveness. The findings have implications for various actors and stakeholders in financial reporting. For example, global regulators should realize that independence from the profession, while simultaneously ignoring local institutional impediments, by no means guarantees the operation of effective national OBs across the globe. Furthermore, in the absence of effective oversight, particularly amid a severe financial crisis, there is a real risk that the quality of auditing will fall and audit fees will plunge, conditions that may bring about a major legitimation crisis for the profession.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: in the next section, we discuss the emergence of accounting and auditing OBs since the early 2000s as a means for regulating globalized capitalism, with particular emphasis on institutional aspects, and we present the research methods employed.
We then outline the international and local institutional settings to demonstrate the environment from which the Greek OB emerged. Next, we present the debate in the Greek Parliament to illuminate prevailing perceptions of independence and clientelism, and to sketch the context in which the new OB was eventually submitted to government control. We then demonstrate the inertia of ELTE through an evaluation of its performance since inception (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . Concluding remarks and implications appear in the last section.
The political economy of OB establishment: an institutional approach
As accounting scholars have observed, the internationalization of accounting and auditing practices is not a recent phenomenon (e.g. Hopwood, 2000; Power, 2009) . Rather, long historical processes have been at work for centuries, as a result of the expansion of a universalistic commercial culture. Power (2009, p. 331) in particular highlights the need to understand "the history and institutional shape of a changing structural coupling between world-level accounting elements and the preoccupation of state agencies" and calls for a shift of emphasis from the nation-state to the "world system of accounting". Arnold (2009a Arnold ( , 2009b Arnold ( , 2012 ) recognizes Power's (2009) position as a useful starting point and argues for an institutional perspective, informed by the political economy of the contemporary inter-state system, to examine the role of accounting in the global economic system. Such a perspective draws attention to the key role of (historically changing) hegemonic states (still the US at the current historical juncture), conflicting interests, and power relations in the governance of global capitalism.
At the turn of the 21 st century, a new international financial architecture was under development to provide urgently-needed stability to a global financial system characterized by recurring crises, the rise of finance capital and inequality among states regarding the power to influence the shaping of emerging regulatory apparatuses (Arnold, 2009a (Arnold, , 2009b (Arnold, , 2012 Humphrey et al., 2009; Wade, 2007a Wade, , 2007b . This new architecture was sponsored by the G7 (G20 since the crisis of the late 2000s; see Humphrey et al., 2009, p. 812 ) and other significant actors in international financial systems. It provided for an upgraded role of various international organizations (e.g. International
Monetary Fund) and the application of a series of global standards and codes of good practice in the management of the global financial system (Wade, 2007a (Wade, , 2007b . These standards of good practice (the SSC system) cover macroeconomic policy and data transparency, institutional and market infrastructures (including international accounting as well as auditing standards), and financial regulation and supervision (Arnold, 2012, p. 367) . The key idea was that adherence to these standards of practice and increased transparency would improve the quality of financial reporting and access to finance, thus further inducing (in a virtuous circle) the observance of these standards (Humphrey et al., 2009 ).
However, Wade (2007a Wade ( , 2007b argues that this new financial architecture promotes the interests of Anglo-American style capitalism and reflects the increasing importance of the finance industry in global economic activity. Furthermore, Arnold (2012) contends that reformers have shown eagerness in rapidly promoting the reforms, regardless of the ability of countries to effectively introduce and assimilate them. Other options, such as slowing down the pace of reforms to give states some breathing space (Arnold, 2012) or setting up truly international regulators to match the global nature of the financial integration (Eatwell & Taylor, 2000) , were rejected at the time.
OBs within the SSC system
A key component of the new regime has been accounting and auditing OBs, which are meant to operate at the state level and to occupy a pivotal role in restoring confidence in financial reporting.
OBs, modeled on the Anglo-American tradition, are promoted as a uniform solution to the need for material improvements in the effectiveness of global financial market regulation (Arnold, 2012; Βüthe & Mattli, 2011; Davis & Green, 2008) .
OBs, local or transnational, are complex, multifaceted units of analysis, with important and diverse characteristics. They are established as formal political institutions, operating at the interface between the world of economy and the world of politics (e.g. Βüthe & Mattli, 2011; Davies & Green, 2008) . As actors within the political arena, OBs are part of the wider decision-making system, assumed to produce and/or effect mandatory rules within a given territory (not necessarily confined to the borders of a particular jurisdiction/state) and for a particular domain (e.g. accounting).
The establishment of accounting and auditing OBs within the SSC context is considered a means to secure an adequate level of quality in financial reporting to facilitate the operation of globalized financial markets (Humphrey et al., 2009; Wade, 2007a Wade, , 2007b . In this sense, the establishment of OBs in the 2000s can be understood as a manifestation of the "accounting internationalization"
process, which has a long history (Hopwood, 2000; Power, 2009 ). However, as Power (2009) notes, accounting scholars have long voiced caution or skepticism about the feasibility of eradicating local "constraints" to the internationalization of accounting practice and regulation, as these constraints are culturally and institutionally embedded and exhibit remarkable resilience (e.g. Bromwich & Hopwood, 1983; Hopwood, 2000 Hopwood, , 2009 Puxty et al., 1987) .
Other scholars have challenged the suitability of externally-induced change, modeled on the AngloAmerican tradition, because it disregards local factors crucial for the project's success (Arnold, 2012; Wade, 2007a Wade, , 2007b . In particular, scholars have questioned the feasibility of pursuing the stability of a global, complex and interdependent financial system through the operation of domestic
OBs across the globe. At the same time, local needs for reform are ignored, leaving the imbalances and inequalities among states in the global economic system neglected. Wade (2007b) suggests that the effectiveness of the system of global oversight should not be taken for granted, and he captures the need for a thorough investigation of OBs in practice thus:
At first glance, transparency, standards and surveillance are as desirable as motherhood and apple pie. To go beyond the first glance we have to ask whether national regulatory authorities have complied with the standards, and whether their compliance makes a difference to the behavior of private market participants (p. 80).
To examine OBs at the local level more closely, we turn to the literature on politico-economic reforms and institution building. O'Donnell (1994) recognizes strong institutions, such as OBs, as key factors for the smooth functioning of the political and economic process and he maintains that the effectiveness of such institutions is contingent on the wider socio-political context (see also Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Schmitter, 1974; Streeck & Schmitter, 1985 Furthermore, the enforcement of a clear distinction between the public and the private interests of office-holders in delegative democracies is cursory, if not absent. In other words, in these countries, whoever wins the elections is in a sense "entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office" (ibid., p.
59
). In addition, delegative democracies are typically omnipotent in introducing spectacular policy reform packages and in setting up various institutions that often imitate successful examples from advanced countries but are in fact highly impotent, or maybe indifferent, in effectively implementing those decisions in practice (ibid.). In short, delegative democracies tend to exhibit characteristics such as: low-quality public administration with limited independence from political pressure; low commitment to sound policy formulation and implementation; limited confidence in and abidance of the rules; weaknesses in contract enforcement, and regulatory capture by elites and private interests (O'Donnell, 1994 ; see also Kaufmann et al., 2013) .
One qualification is warranted with regard to O'Donnell's (1994) ideal typology of democracies.
Representative and delegative democracies should not be considered polar opposites; rather, they differ only in the degree, albeit often significant, to which they exhibit their particular characteristics, and it is not always easy to make a sharp distinction between them.
Building strong institutions and effectively introducing material reforms in member states is critical for the EU, given the political objectives of economic and political integration (European Commission, 2001b ). Yet the difficulties involved show remarkable resilience (e.g. Balkir, Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2013; Falkner & Treib, 2008; Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber, 2005) . EU reform initiatives are, in practice, imposed on states exhibiting distinctively diverse social, political and institutional backgrounds (e.g. Dyson & Goetz, 2003) . Dyson and Goetz (2003) maintain that the peripheral, or less central, states in southern Europe (e.g. Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain) exert considerably less influence than core countries on the formulation of EU policy. As they convincingly argue, the Europeanization project is highly likely to be a mere "top-down" process for peripheral southern member states and may produce variable and contingent outcomes due to social, political and economic differences among various member states.
Studies have shown that the implementation of EU-inspired reforms by member states is often associated with significant gaps between the intended purposes and the actual effects of the Europeanization project (Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2008; Radaelli, 2003) . In a sense, when change is imposed from above (Mouzelis, 1995) , the complex, multifaceted and interdependent domestic system of economic and political power illustrates a form of social "homeostasis" (Simon, 1962, p. 467) . Reforms are internalized in such a way that the system essentially maintains its ex ante equilibrium. Material change is minimized, delayed, postponed and even averted (Mouzelis, 1995; Pagoulatos, 2003) . Blavoukos et al. (2013) Other prior literature in the field of politics has identified links between this reform gap and the particular features of the local political system. For example, in delegative democracies the operation of formal institutions is eroded by non-formalized but strongly-operative practices, such as clientelism (O'Donnell, 1994) , which "cut across the divide between public and private" (Christiansen & Neuhold, 2012b, p. 1) . The issue of clientelism, and more generally the existence of informal practices, is certainly not limited to delegative democracies (Christiansen & Neuhold, 2012a) . Key aspects of the process and outcomes of political and economic reform initiatives can be explained using the "party patronage" approach (Hopkin, 2006; Kopercky & Scherlis, 2008; Piattoni, 2001; Roniger, 2004) . In broad terms, party patronage refers to the actions of political parties in power to put appointees in key positions (in the civil service as well as various commissions and regulatory bodies), so that government policies and objectives are best served (see Piattoni, 2001 Hopkin, 2006) .
A clientelistic political system in delegative democracies means that institutions such as OBs, which in principle should be autonomous organizations, in practice lack independence from the state apparatus, which itself is a prisoner of political parties (Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2008; Lyrintzis, 2005 Lyrintzis, , 1984 Papakostas, 2001) . Party patronage in delegative democracies systematically undermines the operation of OBs as independent horizontal control mechanisms (O'Donnell, 1994 In summary, the theoretical threads on which this article is based suggest that the establishment and development of Anglo-American in conceptualization, OBs should be examined in relation to the dynamics of the political economy of the global economic system. OBs are promoted by the G7/G20 and other powerful global actors as a uniform solution to improve the quality of financial reporting and to help instill stability in a crisis-prone and interdependent global financial system. This need has been so profoundly exposed during the current financial crisis which has shaken the world economy. The proliferation of OBs in the early 2000s rests on the assumption that every country has the capability to successfully establish and operate accounting institutions moulded on Anglo-American governance regimes.
However, the efficacy of local OBs should not be taken for granted, since countries differ in their historical, social, cultural and economic traditions, and these differences, in turn, may condition their ability to introduce systems of effective oversight and related reforms. Thus, the operation of emerging domestic OBs warrants close examination. Countries with a tradition of weak institutionalization (delegative democracies) tend to exhibit significant difficulties in importing reform measures developed in countries with a tradition of strong, operative institutions. The former tend to lack a nexus of horizontal accountability mechanisms, which thus hampers the development of strong OBs. Clientelism, a particular version of party patronage, is a widespread characteristic of political systems in certain European countries (and elsewhere) and is associated with the institutional weaknesses of delegative democracies and their inability to build strong, operative
OBs.
Research methods
This study follows a case study research design (Babbie, 1998; Hussey & Hussey, 1997; Yin, 2002) and its empirical part, which spans the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] , is based on a mix of data sources and triangulation research methodology (Denzin, 1978; Jick, 1979 1993-present) , who is also a partner in a large local audit firm; one local, small audit firm partner and two Big-Four audit firm partners; one senior public servant at the Ministry of Economy; and one member of ELTE's Disciplinary Council.
Our study shares limitations inherent to a qualitative methodology. In addition, we acknowledge that one of the authors (referred to in the paper as "Academic") served as a member of ELTE's accounting arm for two years (2005) (2006) (2007) . To reduce the risk of subjectivity and bias, we note that the paper is mostly based on publically-available written evidence, unrelated to the Academic. In addition, all semi-structured interviews cited herein have been conducted by the other co-authors.
The interaction between global and local institutional settings
The global landscape
In Europe, public oversight of accounting and auditing emerged as a policy matter in the late 1990s, 
It is within this international context that domestic OBs began mushrooming in the early 2000s
across the globe, as one means of regulating crisis-prone globalized capitalism (Βüthe & Mattli, 2011; Davies & Green, 2008; Wade, 2007a) . Although the argument that integrated economies require integrated systems of regulation and oversight has received support (Davies & Green, 2008) , OBs are set up and operate at the local, domestic level. Thus, the structure of these emerging systems of oversight, i.e. dispersed OBs embedded within diverse local contexts, is incongruent with the ever-growing integration of the global financial system. , since it is limited to an advisory and coordinating role within the EU.
The local politico-economic and professional context
As a member of the European Economic Community since the early 1980s, Greece's position within the global politico-economic system has been conditioned by European policies. With regard to accounting and auditing in particular, relevant regulation and practice in the past three decades has largely been shaped by European directives (Caramanis & Dedoulis, 2011) . During the past three decades, successive governments 7 have pursued further integration of the country into the EU.
This effort has entailed a series of liberalization reforms since the early 1990s, among them the liberalization of the Greek audit market in 1992 (Caramanis, 1999) , and culminated in Greece's entry to the euro zone socio-political problems (e.g. OECD, 2009 OECD, , 2010 OECD, , 2011a OECD, , 2011b OECD, , 2012 ).
Greece's lingering economic problems are certainly related to the country's reform capacity problems, resulting from its weak institutionalization and clientelistic political system (e.g. Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2008 ). An OECD report (2011b) explicitly ties Greece's problems to the widely-acknowledged weakness of the state apparatus:
Strong measures … to improve the effectiveness, accountability and integrity of the public administration so that it is "fit for purpose" are a priority, perhaps even the first of the reform priorities facing Greece. Failure to implement a major and integrated public governance reform in Greece is likely to jeopardise the broader reforms required to put Greece back on the path to sustainable growth (ibid., p. 3).
The It is evident that the ASE episode created a legitimation crisis for the government. Under such conditions, tightening regulation or introducing more structural changes has been a state's main response to crisis at various times and locales (Hancher & Moran, 1989; Malsch & Gendron, 2011; Zeff, 2003) . Indeed, a senior public servant has linked the establishment of ELTE with the ASE affair, suggesting that the creation of the Greek OB "was apparently brought forward by the scandal" (interview, 26 September 2013) . During the debate in Parliament on the establishment of ELTE, the sponsor of the bill emphatically suggested that the new regulation was: "an answer to those who argue that the government is somehow related to sleaze and scandals" (Greek Parliament, 2003a , p. 1069 , and Deputy Minister of Economy Fotiadis stated that the government sought to "strengthen transparency" (Greek Parliament, 2003a , p. 1083 as public confidence in the operation of the market had evaporated.
The final local factor to consider is the division within the Greek auditing profession regarding the introduction of independent oversight, which primarily emanated from a lingering intra-professional 9 The ASE scandal was a major political issue in the elections of March 2000.
conflict. This conflict initially erupted in the late 1970s between SOL 10 , a quasi-state auditing organization, and SELE, an aspiring occupational group representing local branches of the big international accounting firms that had been campaigning for access to the statutory audit market (Caramanis, 1999) . The profession was eventually liberalized in 1992 through legislation (ibid.).
This audit reform entailed the introduction of competition between auditors and the formal unification of the profession as members of international accounting firms gained professional recognition. The reform also abolished SOL and established SOEL 11 , a new professional association, largely organized as a self-regulated professional institute. However, the formal unification of the profession in 1992 failed to end this intra-professional conflict which continued 12 , overtly or covertly, around the issue of the control of SOEL's administration. Related to this conflict, the profession stood divided regarding the proposal for the establishment of ELTE, and particularly regarding the transfer of regulatory and oversight powers from SOEL to the new OB.
The Big-Four and international second-tier firms openly supported the reform, while resistance mostly came from SOL SA, the largest (local) audit firm, supported by the Economic Chamber of Greece (OEE 13 ), a legal, compulsory trade association of all graduates in the broader field of economics, including business accountants. Thus, the divided profession, apparently involved in the stock exchange scandal, had a significantly reduced capacity to resist reform (Caramanis, Dedoulis, & Leventis, 2010) .
The deep divide and the power relations within the profession were summarized in a letter to SOEL's Supervisory Council, sent by a partner of a second-tier international audit firm shortly after the government announced its plan to set up ELTE:
10 SOL is the English abbreviation of the Greek Σώμα Ορκωτών Λογιστών -ΣΟΛ (Soma Orkoton Logiston -SOL), which translates as the Body of Sworn-in Accountants.
11 SOEL is the English abbreviation of the Greek Σώμα Ορκωτών Ελεγκτών Λογιστών -ΣΟEΛ (Soma Orkoton Elegkton Logiston -SOΕL), which translates as the Institute of Certified Auditors -Accountants.
12 There was also an abortive attempt to reverse liberalization when PASOK returned to power in 1993 (see Caramanis, 2002 Caramanis, , 2005 .
13 OEE is the English abbreviation of the Greek Οικονομικό Επιμελητήριο Ελλάδος -ΟΕΕ (Economico Epimelitirio Ellados -OEE), which translates as the Economic Chamber of Greece. OEE was established by the (PASOK) government in the early 1980s as a state-corporatist institution and has traditionally been an arena for party competition and clientelism. All practicing statutory auditors, business accountants and tax consultants must have OEE membership. Other membership comes from tax office and banking sector employees. OEE is still capable of exercising some political power, emanating from its membership, which amounts to around 90,000 individuals. However, it has failed to have any significant impact on accounting and related matters (Caramanis, 1999 (Caramanis, , 2005 .
[T]he Greek profession is characterised by an extreme concentration of power in very few audit firms ... in practice, two blocks have been formed in the profession. The one that has all the power in the organs of administration and the other that is seeking to bring it into balance. It is this antithesis that has created many problems in the internal operation, status and the public image of the profession (Second-tier partner, 2002, trans.).
Following the 1992 reform, the great majority of SOL members established the audit firm SOL SA 14 under the leadership of "Unileader" (Caramanis, 2002) -the most important of the dramatis personae in the Greek accounting profession in the past two decades. Unileader, a charismatic extrade unionist of SOL and middle-to-senior member of PASOK, also served as Secretary General (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) of the Ministry of Economy and, for two terms, was President of the OEE during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The formal unification of the profession, however, did not end this intra-professional conflict. It continued, explicitly or implicitly, as SOL SA attempted to reverse liberalization following PASOK's return to power in October 1993 (Caramanis, 2002 (Caramanis, , 2005 .
Eventually though, the intra-professional conflict seemed to abate, and a modus vivendi between the conflicting groups was achieved, subsequent to SOL SA's utterly unsuccessful attack on liberalization in the late 1990s. Following this development, Unileader focused on consolidating his control over SOEL, which is funded through a legally-sanctioned 2% annual membership charge on audit fees. Taking advantage of the one member-one vote system of the profession, he has uninterruptedly been the elected President of SOEL since the early 1990s (he was re-elected in April 2012 for another three-year term of office).
In summary, global influences and pressures (i.e. the EU guidelines and the precedent set by the PCAOB) along with local events (the ASE scandal and intra-professional conflict) created a unique trajectory, conducive to the emergence of a local accounting and auditing OB independent of the profession, well before it became a legal EU requirement. However, the delegative characteristics of Greece created a rather gloomy outlook for the prospect of a truly effective and independent accounting and auditing OB. accountancy, New Democracy is essentially supporting the bill, as they expect to take political advantage of the new institution if they return to power" (Greek Parliament, 2003a , p. 1077 .
Overall, the debate in Parliament revealed a more general lack of trust in public authorities (which are normally presumed to be independent of government and party-political influences and pressures) as a precondition for the smooth functioning of the free market economy (O'Donnell, 1994 The issues of clientelism and lack of true independence of OBs from the government were most explicitly captured by MP Lafazanis thus:
The independence of "independent" authorities is a mockery … You appoint hangers-on to various posts, you name them independent, and then [when things go wrong] you come to say that they have failed and put the blame on them so that you remain protected from criticism. There are two kinds of risks associated with independent authorities. Either they will not do the job they are established for, or they will be overactive, causing problems for the operation of the market … [in Greece and] ... they are in a position to hold the Minister to ransom … and blackmail the government … because they have all the information and the Minister is very vulnerable to adverse publicity (interview, 14 July 2010, trans.).
The establishment of ELTE: subjugating the new OB to government control
The Following the international trend (EU guidelines and the PCAOB precedent), the Law secured the independence of ELTE from the profession.
Formally, ELTE was set up as a public sector legal entity and its mission is to "promote transparency in the operation of business enterprises through accounting standardization, and to ensure the quality of corporate audits" (article 1 of the Law, trans.), and to act as the government's formal advisor on accounting and auditing matters. ELTE is funded by audit firms through a 1% levy on total audit fees 17 , which secures the availability of necessary financial resources.
As figure 1 shows, ELTE is headed by a chairman and two vice-chairmen, who constitute its powerful Executive Committee. The chairman and one vice-chairman are selected by the Ministry of Economy and the second vice-chairman is nominated by OEE
18
, whose leadership at the time was controlled by the governing PASOK. All appointments require confirmation from Parliament.
ELTE's administrative structure is supplemented by a seven-member Administrative Council, comprising three members of the Executive Committee and four other individuals nominated by the 17 This, as of 2010, amounted to almost € 2m per annum in total revenue for ELTE. 18 The OEE gained the right to nominate one vice-chairman of ELTE as a result of its electoral power and effective political mobilization during the debate in the chamber (see Greek Parliament, 2003a , 2003b , and 2003c review-based quality inspection system that was to be introduced. 19 The initially-submitted Law did not provide for representation of the profession in ELTE. However, political pressure during the discussion in Parliament gave SOEL one seat on ELTE's Administrative Council (see Greek Parliament, 2003a , 2003b , and 2003c 23 . However, given the deeply politicized nature of the Greek state and the lingering ineffectiveness of public administration, the close control of ELTE by the government apparently gave cause for concern from the outset, and called into question whether ELTE as an institution would in practice play the vital role for which it had formally been established. We turn to this issue in the next section.
ELTE in a state of inertia
ELTE was envisaged to play a key role in ensuring much-needed transparency and confidence in financial reporting. This would be achieved by improving the quality of corporate audits through the introduction of a system of audit quality inspections. However, since its inception in May 2003, ELTE has, in practice, fallen into an essentially dormant state with regard to improving transparency and confidence in financial reporting. ELTE's situation was acknowledged by its 22 The bill initially provided for severe monetary fines for errant auditors and audit firms, but these penalties were significantly softened in the final text of the law, as the profession stood united against them. 23 According to academic research, Greece has a leading position in earnings management internationally (Christensen et al., 2012; Leuz et al., 2003; Osma & Pope, 2011 (Refenes, 2011, p. 29, trans.) .
The poor state of ELTE was documented in an academic survey of auditors and corporate financial executives (Caramanis & Papadakis, 2008) . The survey, which attracted significant media attention, revealed that Greek oversight authorities were in need of significant improvements in several respects, including: reliability, transparency, staffing, and independence from political and economic centers of power (e.g. Kerdos, 2008; Kourkouta, 2008; Naftemporiki, 2008 The failure of ELTE to perform its duties over the years has been indicated in internal documents prepared by the Academic member of SLOT and a retired senior judge-member of the SPE and submitted to the Ministry of Economy (Academic, 2006 (Academic, , 2007 (Academic, , 2008 Retired Judge, 2006a , 2006b ).
ELTE's deplorable position has also been highlighted in two parliamentary questions raised by MPs
Tatoulis (2009) Audit regulators should have arrangements in place to ensure that inspection staff members are independent of the profession. These arrangements will, as a minimum, include ensuring that staff members should not be practicing auditors or employed by or affiliated with an audit firm, and that the arrangements are not controlled in any form by a professional body.
The problem with the IFIAR requirement was acknowledged by the Chairman of ELTE who The performance of audit quality inspections had the backing of the profession, in an attempt to deal with an acute drop in audit fees in the middle of the ongoing financial crisis (interview with the President of SOEL, 27 July 2013). Even before the advent of the crisis in 2008, a survey found that a significant majority (two-thirds) of auditors supported quality inspections as a means of maintaining audit fees at a satisfactory level (Caramanis & Papadakis, 2008, p. 47) . A senior partner in a Big-Four firm put it thus: "We do believe that audit quality inspections are in the interests of the profession ... to improve credibility and as a safeguard against unfair competition" (interview, 6
September 2013, trans.). No such inspections had yet been completed as of July 2013, and ELTE still appears to remain in an essentially dormant state ten years after its establishment. The inertia of ELTE and the absence of an operating Disciplinary Council have been vividly noted by a senior Big-Four partner: "ELTE has done nothing at all … has performed no audit quality inspections, although it should have. the Disciplinary Council has not been functioning … we know there are cases which have been pending for a very long time … Unfortunately, we have missed the opportunity to improve the status of the profession … and you know we pay for ELTE every year as required by law" (interview, 7 September 2013, trans.).
Explaining inertia: institutional features of a delegative democracy
The establishment of ELTE as a public sector entity under the supervision and control of the Ministry of Economy firmly anchored the new OB to the Greek state apparatus. This lack of independence has implications that go beyond the ability of an OB to express a view that might put the incumbent government in an awkward position. As the case of the Greek OB shows, lack of independence from the government (and general lack of autonomy) in a political system of governance permeated by a tradition of party politics and clientelism, increases the risk of being caught in the cogs of state indifference, red tape, and ineffectiveness (O'Donnell, 1994) . In practice, these interrelated factors include the inability of the OB to deal with basic organizational issues and develop into a functioning institution.
The Chairman of ELTE 2003-2009 commented on the independence of ELTE from the government thus:
As I understand it, at the core of EU policy in relation to oversight has been independence from the profession and this has been secured ... In retrospect, independence from the Greek Ministry of Economy is an equally important issue ... I had talked on a number of occasions to the Minister of Economy regarding the need to ensure ELTE's independence from the government; I had been reassured that appropriate action would be taken but the issue remains unresolved … ELTE is still a public sector legal entity under the control of the Ministry (interview, 16 September 2013, trans.).
Next, we examine the modes that hampered the development of institutions of horizontal accountability.
Party politics and clientelism
In Greek political tradition (Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2008; Lyrintzis, 2005) , the appointment of (key) staff is mostly, though not exclusively, made on the basis of political affiliations rather than merit and capacity to deliver:
In my experience, loyalty or networking is the key factor for appointments to public posts. We often see unqualified and indifferent people get key posts. It is loyalty and networking rather than personal aptitude and knowledge that count. There is a golden rule and in the past some appointees have learned it the hard way: do not attempt to make waves if you want to keep your job ... and it pays off ... it secures a significant source of income (interview with a certified auditor with considerable experience as a member of various accounting regulatory and oversight authorities, 8 September 2008, trans.)
A member of ELTE's leading elite offered his view on the role of party affiliations in filling posts in ELTE thus: "I think, to a significant extent, when ELTE was established the logic of the government was to cover the [EU] requirement and ... to accommodate some of the party people" (Katseli, 2009; Nikolopoulos, 2014; Tatoulis, 2009 ). These conflict of interest incidents do not apparently violate Greek law but certainly constitute a severe violation of the independence requirements of OBs (IFIAR, 2014) .
State indifference and ineffectiveness
Against the backdrop of party politics and clientelism, the risk of ELTE being affected by state indifference and ineffectiveness became evident. ELTE was infected by the "deeply rooted … Greece's political and public administration systems are built in such a way that even minor issues must have the approval of the Minister ... ministers usually like to keep control while the bureaucracy tend to avoid taking responsibility. They [the bureaucracy] keep asking for directions from the Minister or the Secretary General to appear agreeable, and yet they write documents and decisions in such a way so that they cannot be held responsible ... the public administration does not work in the right way and this is an issue for the political system to sort out ( These measures, in view of the severity of the country's financial crisis, have imposed significant reductions in salaries and restrictions on appointments within the public sector. The austerity package that followed the memorandum of understanding has been applied across the entire Greek public sector.
The leadership of ELTE tried to convince the government to exempt ELTE from the restrictions following the memorandum of understanding (interview with the Chairman of ELTE 2009 ELTE -2014 July 2013), which was confirmed by a senior partner in a Big-Four firm: "I do know that appeals were made to the Minister of Economy, even to the Prime Minister himself and to the troika ... to exempt ELTE ... but they had no effect" (interview, 6 September 2013, trans.) . This attempt failed completely because politicians "do not appreciate the role of independent quality inspections for the market ... they do not understand the role of an audit ... they simply do not care . Thus, ELTE has not been given permission by the Ministry of Economy to appoint its own qualified staff, including audit quality inspectors. Even if appointments were allowed, "ELTE will not be able to attract suitably qualified staff at the very low public sector salary rates it legally has to follow"
(interview with the Chairman of ELTE 2003 , 6 September 2013 . As a partner in a Big-Four firm put it:
[I]f one is earning €6,000 month how would he or she decide to become an audit quality inspector and earn €1,500 a month? ... From my professional experience over the past 30 years, if you want to neutralize an institution, a function or a process, you just do not provide the required resources ... and it is dead. I do not have concrete evidence that there is necessarily an evil plan worked out but ... (interview, 6 September, 2013, trans.) .
Or, as the senior partner put it: "[In other countries] they headhunt to get the best audit quality inspectors ... Here they seem to believe that badly paid civil servants will be able to inspect highly technical work performed by the best auditors ... isn't it a joke?" (interview, 6 September, 2013, trans.) .
This section exposes key features of the Greek political system that have inhibited the development of ELTE as an institution. The issue of ELTE's poor performance was directly raised with the Secretary General (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) and the Minister of Economy (2004 in interviews conducted for this study (both on 10 July 2010). Both interviewees agreed that ELTE has essentially remained in a dormant state. They also provided some explanations as to the government's lack of appropriate action, namely: much-needed structural reforms often take years to produce results, which leads to politicians being reluctant to undertake such long-term projects (their average term of office in the Ministry is usually much shorter and, thus, other politicians may reap the benefits); there is a lack of strong, independent, and reform-minded bureaucracy that could push changes through; and, lastly, there is also a widespread lack of trust among the key participants in public administration. These issues also appeared, quite often and to varying degrees, in interviews conducted with key individuals from the accounting profession and members of ELTE, in the context of this study.
Concluding remarks
The construction of accounting and auditing OBs at the national level is being promoted as a key component of the global financial architecture that has emerged since the 1990s. Operating within distinctively diverse local political, economic, and cultural contexts, OBs are considered a uniform solution at the global level, aimed at ensuring high-quality financial information to facilitate the flow of capital across national borders and provide stability to the interdependent global financial system.
In this article, we examine the creation and operation of an OB in a local European setting by employing an institutional approach located within the broader political-economy framework of global capitalism (Arnold, 2009b (Arnold, , 2012 Wade, 2007a Wade, , 2007b . Consequently, we place emphasis on the interaction between global structural factors, institutions, influences, and pressures (namely the unfolding of the SSC project), and the local socio-political characteristics that condition the establishment and effective operation of OBs at a local (state) level. Our analysis is informed by O'Donnell's (1994) conceptualization of delegative democracy, supplemented by literature on economic and political reform in Europe (e.g. Dyson & Goetz, 2003; Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2008; Radaelli, 2003) .
By analyzing a wealth of primary and secondary research material, we illustrate the difficulties and constraints of transplanting and operating OBs which are modeled on the external Anglo-American tradition. Our findings show that deeply-ingrained domestic socio-political characteristics of a delegative nature have indeed inhibited the development and operation of the local Greek OB, as O'Donnell (1994) posits. That is, the newly-established OB has been affected, since inception, by the all-pervasive clientelistic political system, the weaknesses of state apparatus, and the country's reform (in)capacity problems. More specifically, the appointment of ELTE's elite has been decided by successive governments, mainly on the basis of clientelism and political patronage. In addition, ELTE has been under the bureaucratic control of state machinery, despite being privately funded by the profession. Even basic administrative decisions, such as the appointment of audit quality inspectors and administrative staff, need the ex ante approval of the Ministry of Economy.
The Greek OB has remained in a dormant state since its inception. It still lacks appropriate infrastructure and sufficient administrative personnel and has not been granted permission by the government to appoint its own audit quality inspectors. As a consequence, the performance of audit quality inspections has been, at best, erratic. Currently, such inspections can be performed only by outsourcing to the professional body, in contravention of IFIAR's core principle on independence.
The disciplinary function appears to have been stalled for years, despite the existence of several pending cases. In short, ELTE as an institution has failed to become a significant decisional point in the flow of influence, power and policy in the realm of accounting, which is so important for effecting progress.
Our analysis shows that ELTE's decade-long failure is related to the country's delegative characteristics. The Ministry of Economy has failed to take effective corrective action and there is evidence of distrust or distaste toward truly independent authorities that would act as mechanisms of horizontal control. In a sense, the case of the Greek OB illustrates a form of social homeostasis.
In other words, the complex, multifaceted and interdependent system of economic and political power of the country has thwarted the emergence of a truly independent and effective OB in the accounting realm and, as such, has essentially maintained its equilibrium.
Furthermore, by extrapolation, problems in the effective operation of institutions, including accounting and auditing OBs, seem to extend far beyond the borders of Greece, as literature from the fields of politics and social/economic reforms indicates (e.g. Dyson & Goetz, 2003) . Party patronage, clientelism, institutional weaknesses, and state ineffectiveness are not ingrained features exclusive to Greece. Rather, they occur, albeit in varying degrees and forms, in several other jurisdictions (O'Donnell, 1994) . The newcomers to domestic institutional terrains in accounting and auditing are potentially vulnerable to the pathogenesis of local political systems and, in particular, the long historical traditions of party patronage and state ineffectiveness. Thus, while the existing system of oversight appears to be secure against the Scylla of traditional professional control, no care has been taken to deal with the Charybdis of the clientelistic political system, weak institutionalization and state ineffectiveness which are so prevalent in several jurisdictions in Europe and beyond (e.g. Kaufmann et al., 2013 ).
At a more general level, our analysis draws attention to the structural mismatching between the global nature of the international financial architecture underpinning today's economic integration and the fragmented character of public oversight that operates on a country-by-country basis, embedded within its domestic socio-political and economic constraints. This mismatch raises concerns about the effectiveness of OBs embedded within geographically and socio-politically dispersed domestic institutional contexts.
Our study contributes to current academic literature on accounting regulation. We employ O'Donnell's (1994) conception of delegative versus representative democracy, enriched with elements of the broader political economy perspective, to offer a methodological framework for examining the transplanting of externally-induced reforms to diverse local settings. Through the analysis of the Greek OB, we illuminate how local socio-political factors, influences, and pressures condition and eventually limit the effective operation of local OBs. In particular, our case study evidence shows how, in a country exhibiting characteristics of a delegative democracy, the new accounting OB is assimilated into the local socio-political tradition and preexisting ineffective state structures and remains essentially dormant. This finding lends further support to the literature on social and economic reforms in Europe and elsewhere which argues that, for economic, political, and historical reasons, some countries have not been able to successfully transplant externallydesigned institutions to local settings.
This analysis of the Greek OB has significant implications regarding the suitability of a global system of oversight and should be of interest to global and local policy makers, the academic community, and various other stakeholders in financial reporting. The evidence of our case study questions the underlying rationale of pursuing stability in the global, complex and interdependent financial system through the instigation of domestic OBs modeled on Anglo-American traditions and operating in diverse national environments. We demonstrate that the establishment of accounting and auditing OBs does not automatically translate into concrete benefits to financial regulation and the quality of financial reporting. Structural weaknesses at the local level, and the socio-political fabric and power relations underlying them, result in weak and ineffective local OBs.
As a result, material reforms needed at the local level fail to materialize, and imbalances and inequalities among states in the global landscape are maintained (Arnold, 2012; Wade, 2007a Wade, , 2007b . Finally, regarding the accounting profession, we note that the lack of (or ineffective) oversight may be a contributing factor to deteriorating audit quality and plunging audit fees, especially in periods of economic stagnation or crisis. Such conditions may eventually incubate major legitimation crises for the profession.
Building a robust system of accounting oversight in a diverse world economy is certainly a perplexing issue. Some of the difficulties inherent in such a project stem from the structural characteristics of delegative democracies and the (in)ability of individual states to effectively introduce externally-induced reforms. Reversing or slowing down the pace of global financial integration, to allow individual countries the time needed to build effective domestic institutions, does not seem to be a realistic approach at the current historical juncture (Arnold, 2012) .
Furthermore, a regression to technocratic self-regulation, which entails higher risk regulatory capture (Hancher & Moran, 1989) , has been abandoned at this point in time. Given these complex issues, and the fact that expertise is currently controlled by Anglo-American audit firms (Botzem, 2012) , other approaches for improving accounting oversight on a global scale warrant consideration.
One such approach would be to establish local OBs as public authorities, legally enjoying political, economic, and administrative independence from the government. Such independent bodies, which are recognized as important features of contemporary policy making and reflect an increasing awareness of the role of institutions, aim to increase efficiency and policy credibility (Majone, 1994 (Majone, , 1996 . This does not mean that such bodies will, by default, solve the problems in question
for delegative democracies. Evidence shows that clientelistic states have a long history of infiltrating new institutions (O'Donnell, 1994) . However, such bodies, if established under a nexus of effective provisions for staffing and accountability to parliament regarding their operations, would likely have the potential to spur progress in the successful operation of oversight at the local level.
Another option would be to enhance international coordination of the dispersed national OBs through emerging transnational structures, such as IFIAR (at the global level) and EGAOB (at the regional level), both of which are currently limited to an advisory and coordinating role. Currently, their operation, as our analysis shows, has not mitigated the problems of the Greek OB, despite the groundwork they have laid so far to address the structural problem in the international oversight system. Strengthening international coordination might even lead to some form of effective international (global or regional) OB (Arnold, 2012) . This approach might be easier to implement in the case of politico-economic blocks, such as the EU, though it would require considerable coordination and significant hurdles would have to be overcome.
Further research is undoubtedly necessary to establish the generalizability of our findings and their relevance to other locales. Academic inquiry could shed light on the individual histories of accounting OBs in various national contexts, with particular emphasis on their actual performance and impact on the quality of financial reporting and auditing (Arnold, 2012; Malsch & Gendron, vs. common law legal systems) and, more generally, historically-rooted modes of regulation (Puxty et al., 1987) , warrant examination for their relationship to the efficacy of emerging oversight institutions. Another issue requiring academic attention is the position of the global profession and key international audit firms regarding regulatory reforms in the EU and US, and the ensuing spread of national OBs across the globe. Of particular interest is the provision, under Section 106 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that PCAOB conduct reviews of the foreign auditors of companies listed in the US; and the potential for avoiding such reviews if a local OB had already conducted audit quality inspections. The results of the first round of inspections are publicly reported.
Appendix. The time line of events in the establishment of ELTE

May 2010
The audit quality inspectors' contracts expire; the posts remain vacant.
Two audit quality inspectors are appointed by SOEL and seconded to ELTE to deal with urgent investigations ordered by the Courts of Justice. January 2013
The number of audit quality inspectors appointed by SOEL and seconded to ELTE increases to six; as of yet, no audit quality inspections have been completed.
